A brief sketch of the character and achievements of Thomas Saunders

BY

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(By Dr. B. S. Baliga, M.A., Ph.D.)

Like Clive and Hastings Saunders began his career on the lowest rung of the ladder. He could have had but little prospects on the Company's establishment at Bencoolen where he arrived as a writer at the age of 19, in July 1732[1]. Within two years, however, he got himself transferred to Madras[2], where having first served as writer to the Accountant he became a factor in 1737[3]. In 1738 he became "a sub-accountant in the room of Mr. Appleby deceased[4]." In 1739 having come of age he executed his covenants nominating Messrs. Thomas Saunders and Hickman as securities[5]. Next year found him as a second of the Council at Vizagapatam[6]. He took charge from George Stratton but was soon, in 1743, on the appointment of Richard Prince as Chief, ordered to repair to Ingeram as Resident[7]. It was while he was at Ingeram that the orders of the Court of Directors arrived appointing him as the fifth of the Council of Fort St. David, where the seat of the Presidency had been transferred, since the loss of Madras[8]. He, however, continued as Resident at Ingeram and in December 1749 took charge of the post of Chief of Vizagapatam[9]. In July 1750 the Lynn brought the despatch from the Company appointing him to succeed Charles Floyer as Governor[10].

He must have been gratified indeed, at the age of barely 37 years[11], to have been made the head of the affairs of the Company on the Coromandel Coast. But his gratification would not have been unmixed with feelings of doubt and apprehension. For he was at once called upon to shoulder two great responsibilities. He had to face the most critical situation created by the fall of Nazar Jang and the rise of Dupleix in the politics of the Carnatic. He had, at the same time, to invigorate and reform the entire administration of the Company's affairs which had become effete and enervated. Floyer had thought more of the gaming table than of the Council Board, allowed the administration to languish and incurred the wrath of the Company[12]. Dupleix had watched, calculated, seized the right moment to ally himself with Chanda Saheb and Muzafar Jang and resolved at all costs to fight for the supremacy in the South, to set up his nominee Chanda Saheb on the Musnud at Arcot. External danger and internal decay threatened to imperil the Company's possessions. In this welter of affairs Saunders took the only bold course that was open to him. He allied himself heart and soul with the cause of Muhammad Ali and exercised the strictest control over every branch of the Company's administration.

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1 Letters to Fort St. George, 1732—Printed, p. 7.

2 Letters to Fort St. George, 1735—Printed, p. 24.

3 Fort St. George Cons. 1736—Printed, p. 202 and 1737, p. 146.

4 Fort St. George Cons. 1738, p. 128.

5 Fort St. George Cons. 1739—Printed, p. 27.

6 Fort St. George Cons. 1740—Printed, p. 28.

7 Fort St. George Cons. 1743—Printed, pp. 25, 121, 181.

8 Fort St. David Cons. 1748—Printed, p. 124.

9 Letters to Fort St. David, 1749—Printed, p. 11.

10 Fort St. David Cons. 1750—Printed, p. 165.

11 Fort St. David Cons. 1748—Printed, p. 240.

12 Calendar of Madras Despatches, 1744-1755 ; Dodwell, p. vii.

Saunders as a Governor appears cold, stern, and at times dictatorial in the storm and stress period of his rule[13]. His association found him silent and uncommunicative. Lawrence was never sure of his sympathy ; he once accused him of having made him wait for a considerable time before he could get an audience with him[14]. He was lacking in tact and suavity in his dealings with his colleagues ; his correspondence with Lawrence and Colonel Adlercron furnish us innumerable instances in which had he displayed some tact and less reticence, he could have avoided some at least of their rancour and fretfulness[15]. Nor is there any evidence to indicate that he was sociable, that he entertained his friends and subordinates or shone well in conversation. He was indeed no orator[16] ; he was not gifted with eloquence, humour, wit or irony. But if we may judge from his writings he had some talent for sarcasm and he sometimes employed quite unconsciously a natural rhetoric. The reports of the West Coast Committee over which he presided reveal that he had a style at once vigorous and fertile, not wanting in embellishments, frank, direct, and carrying conviction in almost every sentence[17]. The same gift of direct expression, of frankness in intercourse, is discernible in his Country Correspondence, in his letters addressed to the Nawab and other country powers[18]. He detested bombast and long-windedness. Indeed in his intercourse with his friends and subordinates, and in his transactions with the merchants, he never beat about the bush ; he always went straight to the point.

This cold aloofness, though it endeared him to none, served him well in one respect. It enabled him to arrive at decisions with the utmost calmness, to perform his duties unaffected, unhampered by any feelings of fear or favour. He was perhaps the most impartial among his colleagues ; he seldom contravened the rule of seniority in promotions and where he contravened, as in the case of Clive, whom he chose for an important military mission from among the civilians, the results more than amply justified his contravention. It must be remarked that in the matter of promotions even the great Lawrence himself showed more than once his favouritism and partiality ; but Saunders opposed this tendency, whenever injustice was involved to seniors, even at the risk of rousing his anger[19]. In fact, in discharging his duties he cared little for personalities ; he opposed, censured, warned and suspended even members of Council. Whenever he and his colleagues felt it dangerous to pursue the course suggested by Lawrence, he vehemently opposed that policy and got the views of the Government enforced by that veteran notwithstanding his fumings and frettings and threats to quit the command of the army[20]. There is nothing to show, except the groundless accusations of Lawrence, that he distrusted his

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13 Calendar of Madras Despatches, 1744-1755—pp. vii-viii. Dupleix and Clive—Dodwell, p. 54.

14 See Lawrence's letters to Saunders printed in the Military Cons. 1753 and 1754, especially p. 2 of Mil. Cons. of 1753.

15 See Saunders' letters to Lawrence in the Mil. Cons. of Fort St. George, 1753 and 1754, and his letters to Col. Adlercron in Mil. Cons. of 1754. See also Mil. Sundries, Nos. 6 and 7.

16 *e.g.*, on the inauguration of the Charter establishing the Mayor's Court and other Courts of Justice he is reported to have made only a brief speech. Pub. Cons. 1753, Ms. Vol. 81-B—24th Aug.

17 See the Reports in Pub. Cons., Vol. No. 81-B, Cons., dated 8th Oct. 1753, and Vol. 83-B, Cons., dated 7th Oct. 1854.

18 See Country Correspondence, Vols. printed for 1750-51, 1753 and 1755.

19 *e.g.*, Mil. Cons. 1753, printed, p. 2.
1754, p. 135 sqq. Love's Vestiges of Old Madras, Vol. II, p. 484 sqq.

20 References already given to the correspondence between Lawrence and Saunders illustrate this.

colleagues and subordinates. On one point, however, he was firm. He did not permit himself to be drawn into chimerical schemes or on a course of conduct which was in any way detrimental to the Company's interests. He did not allow Colonel Adlercron to interfere into the politics of the Carnatic of which he knew little; nor did he permit him to have the sole voice in matters affecting the discipline and regulation of the Company's army, though he claimed over such matters the sole authority from the Crown[21]. The manner in which he dealt with Adlercron and Lawrence, both autocrats, who could brook no dictation, while it displays his want of tact, shows also his tenacity to preserve and his solicitude to protect the interests of the Company. He accepted their good suggestions and rejected the bad after a full discussion in Council and if they still persisted in the adoption of their views he informed them the full reasons for the non-adoption of those views, or compromised with them where compromise was possible without sacrificing any essential principle or course of conduct necessary for the well-being and safety of the Company's possessions. He established and supported the Mayor's Court against all calumnies; but when the Mayor's Court began to question the authority of the Government, he upheld thaa authority against all opposition[22]. He did everything to protect the prestige, the privileges of the Company, and impressed his strong sense of duty on all who served the Company. When Cooke, a member of the Council of Fort St. David, hesitated, procrastinated and eventually refused to go on an important political mission to Tanjore, unless he were assured of a special compensation, Saunders threatened him with dismissal, unless the orders were carried out at once[23]. Dawsonne Drake, another member of the Council, met with a similar threat when he declined on the pretext of illness to go as a supervisor to Sumatra[24]. Several other examples may be quoted by which he endeavoured to improve the discipline and conduct of the Company's service.

But, if he was a hard task-master, he was a kind and benevolent administrator. The poor, the weak and the oppressed found in him a warm patron who could always be trusted to look to their welfare even amidst the din of warfare and anarchy. His sense of justice and humanity revolted against all kinds of oppressions practised by the rich over the poor, the strong over the weak. He prohibited the craze for Pagoda-building, a craze which had originated in the ambitions of the rich to earn renown, and for which they traded on the superstitions of the poor and compelled them to contribute funds which they could ill-afford to spare[25]. He recommended to the Directors the abolition of the various duties collected by the Managers of the Pagodas from the poor worshippers for which there was neither any precedent nor any prescription[26]. He forbade the renters under strict penalties from collecting duties on horned cattle brought into Madras and on provisions and necessary articles of food[27]. He composed the disputes of the Right and Left hand castes, of the Tengala and Wadagala Brahmins, and preserved as far as possible internal peace and security within the bounds of Madras[28]. In

21 Mil. Cons. 1753—Printed, p. 218 sqq.
22 Pub. Cons. 1753 Ms. Vol. 81-B Cons. 25th July, 30th July.
" 1754, Ms. Vol. 82 Cons. 14th Jan., 21st Jan., 28th Jan., 4th Feb., 18th Feb.
" Ms. Vol. 83-A Cons. 17th June.
23 Mil. Cons. 1753—Printed, pp. 149-151, 152—154, 159—162.
24 Pub. Cons. 1754 Ms. Vol. 83 Cons. 5th Sep., 9th Sep. and 16th Sep.
25 Pub. Cons. 1753 Ms. Vol. 81-A Cons. 9th June.
26 Pub. Cons. 1753 Ms. Vol. 81-B Cons. 31st Decr.
27 Pub. Cons. 1754 Ms. Vol. 82 Cons. 7th January.
28 Pub. Cons. 1752 Ms. Vol. 80-A Cons. 4th May.

an age of inveterate hostility towards the Roman Catholics and Armenians, an age which witnessed the demolition of the Portuguese Church in the White Town[29] and the transfer of the Church built at Vepery by Coja Petrus to the Danish Mission[30], he felt some compassion for the Roman Catholics and granted them certain privileges even against the expressed wishes of the Home Authorities. He allowed them to remain in the White Town until they could conveniently accommodate themselves in the Black Town[31], and granted certain allowances to Fathers Severini and Bernard[32]. He it was who was more than any body else responsible for bettering the lot of the coffrees, the African slaves, who were brought in ship loads from Madagascar to Madras and from thence transhipped to Sumatra to work in the Plantations. He passed a series of orders for providing them proper accommodation, food, cloathing and medical aid[33]. He gave the male members military training and transformed them into tolerably good military material[34]. Nor did he allow the coffree women to be molested by the soldiers or sepoys. A strict guard over them was to be kept and any misconduct detected was to be instantly reported and punished[35]. To his sympathy for the distressed must also be attributed the close control which he exercised over hospital management. As soon as the hospital was shifted from the Fort to Peddanayague Petta he passed, on instructions from Home, a standing order to the effect that one of the members of the Council should, once a week, by turn, visit the hospital and report to the Board any defects or irregularities with suggestions for remedies[36]. The members of the Council, we notice, spoke during these visits not only to the surgeons but also to the patients and enquired into complaints. To these frequent visits must be traced a number of reforms ; the enlargement of and repairs to the hospital wards, the provision of good food during scarcity, of sufficient warm clothing during winter, and of additional ward-boys and coolies to render prompt and efficient service[37]. Above everything these visits provided a much needed control over the conduct of the surgeons.

These are not the only qualities of Saunders that strike us when we study his administration. We meet at every step instances of his ability, his vigilance, his courage, his resourcefulness and a tenacity which rarely knew any obstacles. A depreciating currency, a treasury impoverished by large drafts from the camp, a declining Investment, a society disorganised by warfare and a service unaccustomed to strict control, all these called for supreme statesmanship.

The currency problem confronted Saunders at the very beginning of his administration. He observed that the low price of silver, of rupees, had dislocated trade, discontented the service, and caused even a mutiny at Madras. Since the loss of Madras all Government payments and advances had been made in rupees. Bills drawn on Arcot from all parts of India had been formerly transmitted in rupees, but recently the merchants had given up this

29 Pub. Cons. 1752 Ms. Vol. 80-A Cons. 30th Jan. & 20th Apr.
30 Pub. Cons. 1752 Ms. Vol. 80-B Cons. 9th Octr. & 20th Nov.
31 Pub. Cons. 1752 Ms. Vol. 80-A Cons. 30th Janry.
32 Pub. Cons. 1753 Ms. Vol. 81-B Cons. 6th Aug.
33 Pub. Cons. 1752 Ms. Vol. 80-B Cons. 1st Sep. & 24th Decr.
1753 Ms. Vol. 81-B Cons. 28th Aug.
34 Pub. Cons. 1752 Ms. Vol. 80-B Cons. 25th Sep.
35 Pub. Cons. 1752 Ms. Vol. 80-B. Cons. 1st Sep.
36 Pub. Cons. 1753 Ms. Vol. 81-B. Cons. 4th Dec. sqq.
Calendar of Madras Despatches 1744-55, p. 164.
37 Pub. Cons. 1753 Ms. Vol. 8-B. Cons. 10th Decr.
1754 Ms. Vol. 83-B Cons. 9th Sep., 31st Octr., 25th Novr. & 31st Decr.

practice and made their return in goods. Nazar Jang had brought with him a large quantity of rupees for the payment of his troops. The net result of all this had been an abundance of rupees in the Carnatic, and this had lowered their value while the influx of gold had become very small. To remedy this evil Saunders proposed that all receipts and payments should be made in gold, *i.e.*, in pagodas and "instead of coining when our occasions require we (should) dispose of some silver[38]." Gold could only be procured by the sale of rupees and throughout the period of Saunders' rule, large quantities of rupees were exchanged for pagodas, very frequently, almost every month, to meet the demands of the State[39]. In 1754 it was ordered that all small payments, instead of being made in pagodas, should be made in fanams and for this purpose Fort St. David like Madras was asked to keep always in stock a sufficient quantity of fanams[40].

Indeed, the problem of financing the needs of the State called forth supreme exertions on the part of Saunders and his Council. As the fighting round Trichinopoly continued unabated, large and urgent demands were made from the camp while the merchants increasingly clamoured for advances that they might fulfil their contracts, that they might set the weavers to work. What was supplied by the Company was hardly found sufficient to meet these importunate demands; many a time the Government found itself with a depleted treasury. The usual method of remittances to Fort St. David were by bills; bills drawn on the Presidency in favour of persons who had lent money at Fort St. David were cleared as fast as they were presented. The Presidency also remitted bills on the Company's servants or on the representatives of the well-known bankers of that age, Bucanjee Cassidas. It was more than once felt necessary to order Fort St. David not to issue bills of less than 10 days sight[41]. Borrowing was often resorted to and Saunders himself, we are told, lent large sums of money on urgent occasions[42]. Nor was this all. To meet the large demands Saunders and his Council often had to detain part of the treasure intended for Bengal in spite of the remonstrances of that Presidency[43].

In this period of vast expenditure on the army it was but natural that the Government should scrutinize their budget with care, excise all irregularities and attempt, if possible, to increase their resources. Saunders kept a stringent supervision over receipts and insisted that the Company's farmers should pay their instalments promptly and regularly. He never allowed them any remission unless they could show just cause and swear in their temples as to the truth of their unavoidable losses[44]. Whenever the farms expired he caused careful enquiries to be made so as to ascertain their real value that they might be farmed out at a higher sum[45]. He secured from the Nawab first the Kille of Poonamallee as a jageer to the Company[46], and then the revenues of Seven

38 Fort St. David Cons. 1750—Printed p. 248.
39 The reader will find many instances of this in the Public Consultations.
40 Pub. Cons. 1754 Ms. Vol. 82. Cons. 14th and 21st January.
41 *e.g.*, Pub. Cons. 1753 Ms. Vol. 81-A, Cons. 17th April.
42 *e.g.*, Pub. Cons. 1753 Ms. 81-B. 26th Novr.
1754 Ms. Vol. 82. Cons. 18th Feb.
43 Pub. Cons. 1753 Ms. Vol. 80-B Cons. 9th Oct.
44 Pub. Cons. 1752 Ms. Vol. 80-B Cons. 9th Oct.
1753 Ms. Vol. 81-A & B Cons. 28th May and 10th Decr.
1754 Ms. Vol. 82 Cons. 25th Mar., 29th April, 6th May, 20th May, 28th May.
1754 Ms. Vol. 83-A Cons. 25th June, 15th July and 26th Aug.
45 Pub. Cons. 1753 Ms. Vol. 81-A & B Cons. 9th June & 4th Aug.
46 Mil. Cons. 1754—Printed pp. 137, 176 & 183.

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Magnams, Manamangalam, Covelong and Chingleput, as part payment of the growing debts of the Nawab to the Company[47]. He subjected every item of expenditure of the subordinate settlements to strict scrutiny, eliminated irregularities and waste and insisted on a regular transmission of the accounts every month. In cases of habitual neglect and gross irregularities he threatened to suspend even the members of Council[48]. On being apprised of certain defects in the management of the Company's works he instituted a thorough enquiry[49], appointed a Standing Committee of Works and ordered that all building materials, bricks and chunam, should be obtained on the tender system[50]. He defined the duties of the Company's Engineer ; he laid down that for every construction he should first prepare estimates and that he should undertake no repairs costing over 50 pagodas without the order of the Government[51]. On his suggestion the Accountant was required to draw up monthly an abstract of the expenses of the Settlement compared with the preceding month explaining the causes of increase and decrease, so that a strict watch over expenditure might be maintained[52].

Turning to the Company's commerce Saunders could find but little satisfaction. Here there was much to improve and a great deal to do to prop up a declining Investment. Commerce can hardly flourish where war prevails and the fever of warfare which raged in the Carnatic and spread in the Deccan undermined the Company's Investment. The weavers found it impossible to pursue their trade in peace ; the merchants felt it precarious to entrust them with money ; while the Government experienced much difficulty in procuring merchants who could be expected to fulfil their contracts, and, after having procured them, in advancing them sufficient funds at a time when the demands from the camp practically impoverished the treasury[53]. Yet Saunders and his Council made every endeavour to encourage the Investment both in Madras and the subordinate factories of Fort St. David in the South, and Vizagapatam, Bandermalanka and Ingeram in the North. It is unnecessary to recount here the various strands of the political turmoil of the Carnatic and the Deccan. Suffice it to say that the almost intermittent fighting which prevailed in the South badly hit the Fort St. David Investment, while the intrigues of Bussy, the quarrels of Vizairamrauze, Jaffar Aly Cawn and the Raja of Bobbili, and the incursions of the Marathas considerably affected the Investment of the Northern Factories. To this was added in the Deccan the systematic endeavours of the French to seduce the weavers and merchants, and the scarcity of dodoos, the copper money with which alone the weavers could buy the thread in the local market. In Madras itself the Investment was in no better condition. Saunders and his Council did not fail to grasp the situation. They felt that it was impossible to expect much improvement in the midst of chaos. They frequently sent money both in the shape of cash and bills to the subordinate settlements, consented to buy even inferior cloth at an abatement[54], made urgent arrangements for the supply of dodoos to the Northern Factories[55] and advised their subordinacies to handle their merchants with tact and consideration. The merchants were not to be allowed to run into large arrears to the

47 Mil. Cons. 1754—Printed pp. 153, 182, 183, 185, 197, 203, 212.
48 Pub. Cons. 1754 Ms. Vol. 83-B Cons. 26th Septr.
49 Pub. Cons. 1754 Ms. Vol. 82-Cons. 28th Jan., 29th April, 13th May.
50 Pub. Cons. 1754 Ms. Vol. 82-Cons. 29th April, 13th May and 28th May.
51 Pub. Cons. 1753 Ms. Vol. 81-B. Cons. 10th July.
52 Pub. Cons. 1753 Ms. Vol. 81-B. Cons. 10th July.
53 The Pub. Cons. are full of these complaints.
54 Pub. Cons. 1754 Ms. Vol. 83-B. Cons. 23rd Sep., 25th Novr.
55 Pub. Cons. 1753 Ms. Vol. 81-B. Cons. 2nd July, 13th August.

Company ; the deserving among them were to be advanced and encouraged, the undeserving warned and punished ; but on no account were they to be allowed to defraud the Company[56]. Saunders made some attempts to explore the possibility of providing an Investment at Devicotta[57]. In Madras itself he and his colleagues many a time called the merchants before the Board, exhorted them to fulfil their contracts, reminded them of the various privileges granted them by the Company, and sometimes also warned them that unless they improved their conduct and supplied better cloth, their services would be dispensed with and contracts made with new merchants[58]. Thus by a judicious mixture of appeal to their good sense and fears they were induced to supply the best cloth procurable in the market. New merchants were entertained only when absolutely necessary. Thus, for instance, when Linga Chetty repeatedly refused to comply with the terms offered him for the provision of fine goods, his monopoly was abolished and contracts on favourable terms were concluded with other merchants[59]. It was however not so much in the matter of providing Investment as in the disposal of European goods, particularly of broad cloth, that Saunders and his Council encountered insurmountable difficulties. There was a tolerably good demand for copper and lead ; but for broad cloth, which the Directors sent in large quantities, in every season, there was really little demand in the hot climate of the South. In spite of every endeavour, in spite of frequent auctions, in spite of the encouragements held out to the bidders the sales were poor ; and this fact much incensed the Home Authorities[60].

If Saunders showed uncommon zeal in the internal administration of the affairs of the Company, he showed an equally uncommon ability in conducting their external affairs. He served the Company for more than four critical years with consummate skill and ability. He displayed an uncanny insight into the political calculus of his able and determined rival. It was he who was largely responsible for the frustration of the grandiose schemes of Dupleix. For every move made by Dupleix he made a counter-move on the political chess-board of the Carnatic[61]. It was here that he sent Clive and Lawrence and formed combinations with the King of Tanjore and the Tondiman to counteract the French activities and alliances with the Dalavai of Mysore and the Marathas. It was here that Chanda Saheb was defeated and the cause of Muhammad Ali defended on the battlefield. It was here that he put forth all his exertions, employed all the resources of the Company[62]. Not that he was unmindful or ignorant of the French Schemes in the Deccan. He knew the helplessness of the Nizam. He beheld the growing ascendancy of Bussy.

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56 Pub. Cons. 1753 Ms. 81-B. Cons. 14th July, 24th Sep., 30th Oct.
1754 Ms. Vol. 82 Cons. 11th Feb.
.. Ms. Vol. 83-A. Cons. 20th July.
57 Pub. Cons. 1753 Ms. Vol. 81-B. Cons. 5th Nov., 4th Dec.
1754 Ms. Vol. 82 Cons. 4th March, 25th March, 6th April, 3rd June.
.. Ms. Vol. 83-B. Cons. 31st October.
58 Pub. Cons. 1752 Ms. Vol. 80-A. Cons. 15th June.
1753 Ms. Vol. 81-A. Cons. 21st May.
1754 Ms. Vol. 82 Cons. 22nd April.
59 Pub. Cons. 1753 Ms. Vol. 81-B. Cons. 2nd August.
60 Pub. Cons. 1753 Ms. Vol. 81-B. Cons. 23rd April, 8th Oct., 5th Nov., 20th Decr.
1754 Ms. Vol. 82 Cons. 4th Jan., 18th Feb., 13th March, 22nd April, 13th May, 20th May.
.. Ms. Vol. 83-A & B Cons. 17th June, 16th Sep.
61 The reader is referred specially to the Military Consultation and French Correspondence Volumes of the period.
62 See Mil. Cons. Vols. for 1752, 1753 and 1754—Printed.

He encouraged and instigated Shanavaz Cawn, Jaffer Ali and Vizairamrauze to put up a determined opposition to the French[63]. Beyond this, however, he did not proceed for the precise reason that he did not feel justified in employing the English forces in two separate far off theatres of warfare when those forces were invariably smaller than the forces which the French could command in the Carnatic alone, and when he realized that a decisive French victory in the Carnatic implied a certain ruin to the Company's Settlements on the Coast. He was the first to foresee that the cause of Muhammad Ali was the cause of the English, that the prosperity or adversity of the one was intimately bound up with the prosperity or adversity of the other. Hence it was that he supported the Nawab with all the men and money at his disposal and refused to buy peace at Sadras unless Dupleix acknowledged the Nawab's authority[65]. It was only when the clouds gathered thick, when in spite of Lawrence's victories the strength of the enemy seemed inexhaustible, that he proposed to detach the Dalavai and to bind him to the Company and the Nawab by ceding to him Trichinopoly. This involved some sacrifices on the part of the Nawab, but he regarded these sacrifices necessary in order that larger sacrifices might be avoided and the French robbed of a powerful ally and overthrown[65]. This policy might, no doubt, be questioned, charged with inconsistency on the ground that it implied weakening the Nawab instead of strengthening him and giving up the prestige gained at the cost of so much blood and treasure instead of pursuing it. But it was an inconsistency which he might well plead was justified by stern political necessity. For, without recourse to it, he described no prospects either for the Company or for the Nawab engaged as they were with diminishing resources in a protracted struggle with the Dalavai and Dupleix. When circumstances changed, when fresh supplies came from Europe, he attempted to organise a vast scheme to overthrow the French in the Arcot country[66]. But when Godeheu proposed peace he accepted it securing in fact for the Nawab and the Company the *status quo* and a breathing space within which to recoup themselves and to muster all their strength for the coming struggle of the Seven Years War[67].

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63 See Mil. Cons. Vol. for 1753 and 1754—Printed.
64 Mil. Cons. 1753—Printed p. 207 sqq.
1754—Printed p. 22 sqq.
65 Mil. Cons. 1754—Printed pp. 55, 62 sqq., 71, 76—78, 94—96, 104—106, 144—147, 15.
173—175.
66 Mil Cons 1754—Printed p. 276 sqq.
67 Mil. Cons. 1754—Printed pp. 176-177, 187-188, 195, 201, 205-206, 214-215, 225—227.
233—235, 250, 256-257, 273, 282-283, 286—288, 290—298.

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